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CORPORATE LAW’S FORGOTTEN
CONSTITUENTS: REIMAGINING CORPORATE
LAWYERING IN ROUTINE BUSINESS CONTEXTS
Melissa E. Romanovich*
Although they are artificial entities, corporations are operated, managed,
and represented by people. Sometimes, these people have personal interests
at stake—interests that are separate and distinct from the corporation’s
interests and that arise from these people acting in their corporate roles.
These personal interests and related potential liabilities range from
employment concerns and civil liability to criminal prosecution and
imprisonment. Until now, however, the law has determined that, in most
situations, a corporation’s lawyer neither represents the corporation’s
constituents nor their personal interests. The corporate lawyer, therefore,
has the challenging role of discharging the proper ethical and legal
obligations to the corporate client while ensuring that the corporation’s
highest-level employees are not misled or left in dire legal straits themselves.
Professional responsibility concerns about corporate attorneys’ conduct
in these contexts have gone largely undiscussed. This Note evaluates how
corporate attorneys have typically structured communications with
corporations’ constituents—via the “entity theory” and, sometimes, joint
representation—and suggests a new way to structure corporate counseling
in routine business matters. Accordingly, this Note proposes a new model
rule—Rule 1.13(h)—for the American Bar Association to consider to allow
corporate attorneys to inform officers and directors, for example, of the
personal risks associated with their business conduct. A new model rule will
assist corporate attorneys in navigating the thorny ethical considerations of
these uncharted waters without compromising the duties owed to the
corporate client.
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INTRODUCTION
A corporation1 is an artificial entity—“invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law.”2 A corporation’s fictional legal existence
means that it can only possess the properties, rights, and powers3 that its
corporate charter confers.4 Yet, even with such seemingly limited authority,
a corporation can “conduct business in its own name with virtually all the
1. This Note uses “corporation” to refer to publicly held companies. Although there may
be commonalities with other types of organizations, the applicability of the ethics issues
addressed herein to such alternative entities is beyond the scope of this Note.
2. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
3. See When Did Companies Become People? Excavating the Legal Evolution, NPR
(July 28, 2014, 4:57 AM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/335288388 [https://perma.cc/
9LSX-LERN] (explaining the history of corporate legal personhood and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent expansion of corporations’ rights).
4. A corporate charter is “[a] document that one files with the secretary of state upon
incorporating a business” and is usually “the articles of incorporation.” Corporate Charter,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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powers of a natural person.”5 A corporation must pay taxes,6 can enter into
contracts with third parties,7 and can sue, and be sued, for any wrongdoing.8
A corporation is, for all intents and purposes, a legal person with legal
personality.9
A corporation cannot, however, manage its affairs alone.10 It must engage
with the marketplace and the world through the calculated and informed
decisions of the sophisticated individuals who manage it.11 And a
corporation can only communicate with and receive legal advice from its
attorneys through the individuals who govern the corporate entity.12 Despite
this structure of communication, the law currently assumes that the corporate
attorney owes all professional obligations to the corporate client13—the
corporation itself—rather than to the corporation’s constituents.14 These
constituents, instead, are typically treated as third-party nonclients.15
A problem thus arises where a corporation’s constituents’ interests diverge
from those of the corporation itself.16 Corporate attorneys’ legal advice

5. Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee Owed
More Protection than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Forming a Corporation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/forming-a-corporation [https://perma.cc/WN34LAUL] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
7. See James R. McCall, The Corporation as Client: Problems, Perspectives, and
Partial Solutions, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 628 (1988).
8. See,
e.g.,
Starting
a
Case,
N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS.,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/smallclaims/startingcase.shtml [https://perma.cc/967HVTHE] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (explaining that in New York City, for example,
corporations can be sued and can similarly bring actions); see also Claire Provost & Matt
Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That Lets Corporations Sue Countries, GUARDIAN (June
10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-letscorportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid [https://perma.cc/VK59-VJCK] (discussing lawsuits lodged
by multinational corporations against states).
9. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819); see
also Corporations, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/corporations [https://perma.cc/X8FP-ADQB] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (explaining that
corporations: (1) can sue and be sued; (2) must pay taxes, albeit under a different tax scheme
than that of individuals; and (3) have perpetual lives).
10. See Susan B. Heyman, Corporate Privilege and an Individual’s Right to Defend, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1112, 1123–24 (2017).
11. See id.; see also infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See Tate, supra note 5, at 2 n.3 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981)); see also infra Part II.A.
14. This Note uses “constituent” to refer to a corporation’s “duly authorized constituents,”
which, within the meaning of the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.13, includes
“[o]fficers, directors, employees and shareholders . . . of the corporate organizational client.”
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). This Note uses
“constituent” to refer specifically to corporate officers, directors, and other high-level
management employees. “Constituent” may be used interchangeably with “officer,”
“manager,” or “individual” throughout this Note. See id.; see also infra Part II.A.
15. See John Levin, Ethical Issues in Serving the Organization as Client, 81 ILL. BAR J.
483, 483 (1993).
16. See id. (explaining that corporate client representations may be rewarding but may
also present serious professional responsibility challenges).
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generally does not affect constituents’ personal legal interests.17 Sometimes,
however, advice given in routine circumstances18 may implicate a
constituent’s interests.19 These interests may diverge from the corporation’s
interests, for example, where a constituent’s actions may result in termination
of employment, civil liability vis-à-vis the corporation, or even criminal
prosecution.20
The law does not, however, adequately anticipate such circumstances; it
neither instructs the corporate attorney how precisely to handle situations that
may implicate constituents’ personal legal interests21 nor does it explicitly
detail which duties the corporate attorney owes to these particular
nonclients.22 These “intrinsic ambiguities”23 make abiding by the rules of
professional responsibility especially complex for corporate attorneys.24
Professional responsibility concerns pertaining to corporate attorneys’
conduct and duties have received minimal attention compared to other ethics
issues arising in the law.25 In fact, “[m]ost of the critical commentary
addressing issues of significance to corporate counsel” has only focused on
attorney-client privilege and “the rights of corporate counsel in
The
employment-related disputes with their employer-clients.”26
understanding of proper ethical conduct in such contexts is further
complicated by professional responsibility norms that “regulate the provision
of legal services to concrete individuals” rather than to entities, as governed
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Model Rules”) and ethics
jurisprudence.27
This Note does not attempt to address all ethical and professional
challenges faced by corporate counsel.28 Rather, this Note focuses on the
17. See Michael H. Graham, 4 HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 503:3 (9th ed. 2020)
(explaining that a representative of the corporate client obtains legal advice and acts on behalf
of the client).
18. This Note uses the phrase “routine situations,” “routine matters,” and “routine
circumstances” to refer to noninvestigative business contexts. See infra Part III.
19. See generally DENNIS P. DUFFY, SELECTED ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM ISSUES IN
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES (2008); see also John L. Reed, Avoiding Personal
Liability:
A Guide for Directors and Officers, DLA PIPER (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/04/avoiding-personal-liability/
[https://perma.cc/C46Y-M3G3].
20. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). See generally
Duffy, supra note 19; infra Part I.C.
21. See Tate, supra note 5, at 68.
22. See id. at 68–69.
23. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J.
1011, 1011 (1997).
24. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 9th ed.
2019) (“[R]epresenting an entity can be the most conceptually complex area of professional
responsibility.”).
25. See Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and
Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1023 n.3 (1997).
26. Id.
27. McCall, supra note 7, at 623.
28. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and
Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 (2006).
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ethical and legal obligations that corporations’ lawyers29 owe—or should
owe—to corporations’ officers, directors, and other high-level management
employees when these constituents’ personal interests diverge from those of
the corporation, especially in routine business contexts.30
This Note urges the American Bar Association (ABA) to adopt a new
model rule that establishes an appropriate standard of conduct for corporate
attorneys to follow when representing a corporation through the
corporation’s duly authorized constituents. Similar guidelines and particular
warnings already exist in other areas of corporate law, such as in investigative
contexts.31 In routine matters, however, corporate attorneys’ options for
structuring relationships and routine communications with corporate
constituents are not clearly defined and have been historically limited.32 A
new rule will ensure that corporate constituents are not only advised to act in
the corporation’s best interests but also informed of the personal liabilities
associated with acting on behalf of the corporation.33 This information will
allow constituents to make fully informed decisions for themselves and for
the companies they manage.34
Part I of this Note provides relevant background information pertaining to
corporations’ status as the client. Part I also assesses the legal and ethical
implications governing attorneys’ interactions with corporations’
constituents. Part II evaluates how corporate attorneys have historically
interacted with, advised, and informed the corporate client and corporate
constituents. Part III addresses these traditional methods’ shortcomings and
proposes a new way to structure the relationship between the corporate
attorney, the corporate client, and the corporate constituent. Finally, Part III
also recommends the draft text for the proposed model rule: Model Rule
1.13(h).
I. CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE, TOO: COUNSELING THE CORPORATION
Corporations have long been important clients for the American corporate
lawyer.35 Indeed, lawyers’ representation of corporations has upheld these

29. This Note addresses professional responsibility challenges pertaining to the lawyer for
the corporation, regardless of the lawyer’s status as “inside legal counsel” or “outside legal
counsel,” although certain in-house counsel ethics issues may be further nuanced due to such
lawyers’ dual status as employee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2000) (explaining that “a lawyer’s responsibilities to a
client organization are the same in both capacities”); see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS—THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY § 1.13-1 (2021) (“Rule 1.13 applies equally to outside lawyers and in-house
counsel. Both inside and outside lawyers represent the entity as client acting through its duly
authorized constituents.”).
30. See infra Part I.C.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. See infra Part III.B.
35. See McCall, supra note 7, at 628.
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entities’ rights to file for bankruptcy,36 permitted successful companies to
merge and expand their brands,37 and even inspired ethical changes in
corporate governance and boardroom conduct.38 As such, lawyers have
played a “critical role” in regulating the “modern corporate enterprise.”39
The representation and counseling of these abstract entities have, however,
involved challenges.40 The issues addressed in this Note—the relationships
between corporations’ lawyers and corporations’ constituents—often arise
because corporate law has conditioned corporate attorneys to represent the
corporation as an entity, often to the detriment of the people behind the
corporate curtain.41 In other words, corporate attorneys are generally
assumed to owe professional loyalties to the corporate entity and the
corporate entity alone.42 This distinction is frequently strained, depending
on the nature of a constituent’s relationship with the corporation and its
counsel, as well as the context or the scope of the representation itself.43
This part provides background information about the corporate entity as
the client. Part I.A addresses the ethical and legal standards by which
attorneys represent corporations through their constituents and provides a
brief overview of corporate structure and corporate governance. Part I.B
examines the obligations that corporate attorneys generally owe to
corporations’ constituents as unrepresented nonclients and further qualifies
such duties depending on the context of the interactions. This background
information helps demonstrate how a corporation’s officer, for example, may
be vulnerable to the actions of the corporation and its attorney.44 Part I.C
36. See Stephanie Saul, Elizabeth Warren’s Days Defending Big Corporations, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/politics/elizabeth-warrencorporations.html [https://perma.cc/BA7B-VMEF].
37. See Inspire Brands to Buy Dunkin’ Brands Group for $11.3 Billion Including Debt,
CNBC (Oct. 30, 2020, 9:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/30/inspire-brands-to-buydunkin-brands-group-for-11point3-billion-including-debt.html
[https://perma.cc/X289A6JV].
38. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Corporate Lawyer’s Idea: Rein in ‘Sociopaths’ in the
Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/business/
dealbook/corporate-governance-reform-ethics.html [https://perma.cc/2U4F-8KAG].
39. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of
Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 14 (2003).
40. See McCall, supra note 7, at 628. See generally THOMAS E. SPAHN, ETHICS
CONSIDERATIONS FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: HYPOTHETICALS AND ANALYSES (2013),
https://www.vsb.org/docs/sections/corporatecouncil/annualmtgcle2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NJA-EU9K].
41. See THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939) (“[P]ay no attention to that
man behind the curtain.”); see also infra Part II.A.
42. This is known as “entity theory.” See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 1
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also infra Part II.A.
43. See Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 196 (2001) (noting the
“triangular relationship between the lawyer, the client, and the client’s agents”); see also
Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 965
(2005) (“The specifics of a general counsel’s role . . . vary considerably depending on . . . the
size of the corporation . . . as well as on the complexity and nature of the legal and regulatory
questions that the corporation must address.”).
44. See Tate, supra note 5, at 7.
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evaluates the personal risks that constituents face in light of a recently
changing corporate landscape, especially where these constituents rely on
corporate counsel’s advice, despite being underinformed.
A. The Corporation As Client
In representing a corporation, corporate lawyers must consider the ethical
obligations they owe to the corporation as the client.45 They may also
contemplate the risks that the corporation—and perhaps its constituents—
face when engaging in certain conduct.46 Part I.A.1 evaluates the Model
Rules relevant to the issues addressed herein. Part I.A.2 considers the
application of such ethical considerations in light of the realities of corporate
structures and corporate governance.
1. The Ethics of Corporate Representation
The ABA’s Model Rules are the foremost authority on legal ethics in the
United States.47 The Model Rules serve as examples of ethics rules and
“provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.”48 The Model Rules,
however, are not exhaustive, and they do not detail all possible considerations
that should inform attorneys’ conduct or advice.49
Different jurisdictions have different ethical standards.50 Still, almost all
states have adopted or use some form of the Model Rules.51 Unless a
particular state adopts the Model Rules indiscriminately, the Model Rules
themselves are not binding on attorneys in those jurisdictions.52 Rather,
states incorporate what they perceive to be the optimal rules and make
changes relevant to their jurisdictions.53 For example, the New York Code
of Professional Responsibility is the authority on attorneys’ ethical
obligations in New York State.54 Nonetheless, a corporate attorney may look
to relevant model rules for guidance when navigating a variety of corporate
ethics issues or other thorny legal questions.55 The Model Rules are not
designed to create potential causes of action against attorneys but rather are
45. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39, at 16–17.
46. See Thomas E. Rutledge, When Your Client Is an Organization—Some of the
Problems Not Resolved by Rule 1.13, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 357, 374 (2013) (“[A]ttorneys
representing organizational clients may have obligations to protect the interests of the
organization’s constituents, notwithstanding the limitations of Rule 1.13.”).
47. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39, at 15.
48. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
49. See id. pmbl.
50. See Ethics and Professional Responsibility, GA. STATE UNIV. L. LIBR. LIBGUIDES,
https://libguides.law.gsu.edu/c.php?g=253396&p=1689859 [https://perma.cc/BAZ3-MNSQ]
(July 2, 2021, 2:46 PM).
51. See id.
52. See Stephen Gillers, Some Misperceptions Among Corporate Lawyers, N.Y. LEGAL
ETHICS REP., http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/some-misperceptions-among-corporatelawyers/ [https://perma.cc/6CCD-7WV4] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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created by disciplinary authorities and agencies to provide guidance for
regulating attorneys’ conduct.56
Model Rule 1.13 (“the Rule”), in particular, governs and prescribes the
ethical duties of attorneys who represent corporations, organizations, and
other entities.57 Most importantly, the Rule explains that a corporation can
only act through its duly authorized constituents.58 Similarly, a corporate
attorney can only interact with or represent the corporate client through these
individuals.59 Former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist noted in Upjohn
Co. v. United States60 that corporations—even more so than individuals—
rely on counsel to understand how to comply with the law.61 In these
frequent interactions with the individuals who manage and make decisions
on behalf of the corporation, however, the lawyer is not generally understood
to owe duties “independent of [the] duty to the corporate entity.”62 Indeed,
the attorney’s representation of the corporation does not automatically extend
to the corporation’s constituents.63
Corporate constituents’ interests are usually aligned with those of the
corporation.64 For example, constituents’ diligent corporate governance
typically translates into a corporation’s successful financial performance and
“strong social or environmental performance.”65 In these situations, Rule
1.13(g) also permits the corporation’s lawyer to represent the corporation’s
constituents.66 At minimum, such dual representation must comply with the

56. See id. pmbl.
57. See id. r. 1.13; see also Timothy M. Middleton, Note, “Watered-Down Warnings”:
The Legal and Ethical Requirements of Corporate Attorneys in Providing Employees with
“Upjohn Warnings” in Internal Investigations, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 951, 956 (2008).
58. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (“A lawyer employed or retained by
an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”);
see also id. cmt. 1 (“Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of
the corporate organizational client.”); Robert R. Summerhays, The Problematic Expansion of
the Garner v. Wolfinbarger Exception to the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 TULSA
L.J. 275, 298 (1995).
59. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(a); see also id. cmt. 1.
60. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
61. Id. at 392.
62. Summerhays, supra note 58, at 298.
63. See GSI Com. Sols., Inc. v. BabyCenter, LLC, 618 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2010)
(restating the notion that a lawyer who represents a corporation does not necessarily represent
the corporation’s constituents or affiliated organizations); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 2.
64. See generally Lynn S. Paine & Suraj Srinivasan, A Guide to the Big Ideas and Debates
in Corporate Governance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/a-guideto-the-big-ideas-and-debates-in-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/7ULT-64AL]. See
also Ralph Gomory & Richard Sylla, The American Corporation, DÆDALUS, Spring 2013, at
102,
106,
https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/daedalus/downloads/
Sp2013_American-Democracy-and-the-Common-Good.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9PD-BQTX]
(explaining that, historically, “[t]he interests of [corporate] managers, stockholders, workers,
consumers, and society seemed well aligned”).
65. Paine & Srinivasan, supra note 64.
66. See infra Part II.B.
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criteria of Model Rule 1.7; it also requires the informed consent of the
corporation or its shareholders.67
Sometimes, however, “the organization’s interest may be or become
adverse to those of one or more of its constituents.”68 Model Rule 1.13(f)
addresses attorneys’ duties when dealing with corporate constituents whose
interests conflict with those of the corporate client.69 A constituent’s
interests need not be entirely at odds with those of the corporation, but the
interests may be sufficiently contrary to influence an attorney’s
representation.70 When these situations arise, corporate attorneys can warn
corporate constituents about the limited scope of the corporate representation
and inform constituents that their communications with the attorney may not
be privileged.71 These warnings are not entirely helpful because corporate
attorneys are not required to advise constituents of their personal risks or
suggest that constituents retain independent counsel.72 These warnings are
also left to the discretion of the corporate attorney, and the need for such
warnings “may turn on the facts of each case.”73
The representation of corporations implicates other model rules, in
addition to Model Rule 1.13.74 Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3, for example, require
the corporate attorney to represent the corporate client with “competency and
diligence.”75 Indeed, one of the corporate attorney’s most important duties
is to advise the corporation in a “conscientious and intellectually honest . . .
manner, and to counsel the board to act only upon complete understanding
of the issue being decided.”76
Finally, Model Rule 4.377 provides the corporate lawyer with guidance
about dealing with unrepresented persons—for example, a corporation’s
67. Model Rule 1.7 prohibits the dual representation of two clients if “the representation
of one client” is “directly adverse” to the representation of the second client or if “there is a
significant risk” that the lawyer’s legal or personal obligations will harm the representation of
more than one client. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(a); see also infra Part II.B.
68. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 10.
69. See id. r. 1.13(f).
70. See id. (“In dealing with an organization’s [constituents] a lawyer shall explain the
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”); see also
infra Parts I.C, II.B.
71. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 9th ed.
2019).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See Sarah H. Duggin, et al., Ethical Rules and Professional Liability Risks of Business
Lawyers Advising on Executive Protection Programs, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 28, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2019/07/executiveprotection/ [https://perma.cc/G6ZE-T6YA].
75. Id.
76. E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 BUS. LAW. 1413, 1418 (2004).
77. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“In dealing on
behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or
imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal
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constituents.78 This guidance ensures that the corporation’s attorney does
not mislead a corporate constituent into thinking that the lawyer represents
the constituent’s interests if that is not the case.79 Model Rule 4.3
“distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose
interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer’s client and those in which
the person’s interests” do not conflict with the client’s.80 While commentary
suggests that attorneys are prohibited from providing advice to unrepresented
persons whose interests are adverse to the client’s,81 Model Rule 4.3 does not
address attorneys’ provision of legal advice to unrepresented persons whose
interests are merely “different” from the client’s.82
2. Corporate Structure and Corporate Governance Considerations
Notwithstanding the professional obligations attorneys must consider,
corporations also have complex organizational structures that make corporate
attorneys’ jobs even more difficult.83 Indeed, corporations are artificial
persons84 typically organized in a trilateral manner.85 Shareholders own the
corporation through purchased shares of dispersed stock.86 Directors are
elected by the shareholders and run the corporation pursuant to state law,
internal rules, and the corporation’s charter and bylaws.87 The directors then
choose the officers and delegate management tasks to them.88 These officers
and a corporation’s other duly authorized constituents speak for and act on
behalf of the corporation89 pursuant to attorneys’ advice.90 Through these
duly authorized constituents, corporate attorneys might advise the
corporation on any number of matters.91 A corporate attorney can help a
advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.”).
78. See infra Part I.B.
79. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.3 cmt. 1.
80. Id. r. 4.3 cmt. 2.
81. See id. (qualifying this prohibition, however, by explaining that “[w]hether a lawyer
is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the
unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur”).
82. For a more thorough discussion of the differences between constituents’ “different”
versus “adverse” interests with respect to the corporation, see infra Part I.B.1.
83. See 29 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Liability of a Director to a Corporation for
Mismanagement § 133 (1995).
84. See
Artificial
Person,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/artificial_person [https://perma.cc/7XSG-4JRH] (last
visited Aug. 9, 2021) (noting that corporations are the most common artificial persons).
85. See supra note 83.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Kim, supra note 43, at 180.
90. See John A. Humbach, Director Liability for Corporate Crimes: Lawyers as Safe
Haven?, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 437, 441 (2010–2011) (“The corporation’s lawyers have a
prominent (indeed, statutory) role in protecting the directors and senior management from
liability . . . they too are fiduciaries . . . [t]he active role of the corporation’s lawyers cannot
be ignored.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
91. See generally Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39.
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corporation “plan, structure, negotiate, draft, and implement” the
corporation’s transactions.92 Or, an attorney may advise corporate managers
about handling an unwanted tender offer or a hostile takeover.93 Regardless
of the nature of the counseling, the law currently recognizes the corporate
entity as separate and distinct from the individual constituents.94 The
relationship between the corporation and the corporation’s attorney is,
therefore, understood to be a bilateral one whereby the attorney owes
fiduciary duties to the corporate client alone.95 Because of the complex
compositions of these corporate entities—which are comprised of multiple
individuals
with
“potentially
differing
interests”96—attorneys’
representations of corporations are inevitably “prone to internal conflicts that
do not arise in individual representation.”97
B. Clarifying the Corporate Lawyer’s Role
As discussed, the corporate lawyer typically owes duties to the client rather
than to the agents who represent or speak on the corporation’s behalf.98
Inevitably, though, as a corporate attorney advises the corporate client
through its officers and other managers, the attorney develops relationships
and may recognize that these individuals have personal interests at stake even
with respect to the corporation’s most routine matters.99 The ambiguous
nature of the relationship between the corporate attorney and a corporation’s
constituents—and what the corporate attorney is permitted to tell or discuss
with these constituents—is the crux of this Note.
This part demonstrates how a corporate attorney can clarify the attorney’s
obligations to the corporate entity and to its constituents, depending on the
context of the relationship and the scope of the representation. Part I.B.1
addresses a corporate attorney’s existing duties when dealing with
92. Id. at 14.
93. See Ralph Jonas, Who Is the Client?: The Corporate Lawyer’s Dilemma, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 617, 617 (1988).
94. See id. But see Thomas D. Morgan, The Client(s) of a Corporate Lawyer, 33 CAP. U.
L. REV. 17, 23 (2004) (“Such employees and their interests should be seen as an integral part
of the corporate fabric.”); David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No
Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html
[https://perma.cc/JHP79XZH] (explaining that corporations are increasingly paying attention to the rights and
interests of the stakeholders rather than just the interests of the shareholders).
95. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 518, 667 (1819) (Story,
J., concurring) (explaining that a corporation “is a collection of individuals, united into one
collective body, under a special name, and possessing certain immunities, privileges and
capacities, in its collective character, which do not belong to the natural persons composing
it”); see also Levin, supra note 15, at 483.
96. William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An
Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 59 (2003); see also Middleton, supra
note 57, at 951 (explaining that, notwithstanding the obvious differences between individual
and entity representation, lawyers have many of the same duties).
97. Simon, supra note 96, at 59.
98. See infra Part II.A; see also Paula Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics Lessons for
Corporate Counsel, 69 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 975, 981 (2019).
99. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39, at 17.
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constituents as unrepresented persons. Part I.B.1 also surveys other legal
contexts in which members of the bar and the bench advise or inform
nonclients about risks and liabilities. Part I.B.2 evaluates established
practices of giving warnings in other corporate contexts, such as in internal
investigations, that may provide the foundation for the implementation of
additional required warnings about personal interests in routine corporate
matters.
1. Interacting with Unrepresented Persons
Barring unusual circumstances in which a corporate officer has proactively
retained independent counsel for personal interests,100 a corporation’s
constituent is deemed “unrepresented” by law.101 In other words, despite a
constituent’s professional relationship with the corporation, constituents are
treated by law as if they are “total stranger[s] to the organization.”102
In dealing with “unrepresented persons,”103 an attorney must consult
Model Rule 4.3, which provides that when an attorney “knows or reasonably
should know” that an unrepresented person does not understand the
attorney’s role in a matter, the attorney must make “reasonable efforts” to
correct the unrepresented person’s misunderstanding.”104 Model Rule
1.13(a) similarly requires the attorney to clarify the attorney’s role in
representing the corporation to the corporate constituent but only where a
constituent intends to harm the corporate client in some way.105 If the
constituent’s interests merely differ, the attorney may not be required to
provide any such warnings.106 Rather, the attorney’s duty to clarify the
nature of the attorney’s obligations is determined by the specific
circumstances of each situation because “assessing the nature of such a duty
requires balancing several considerations.”107
These rules, interpreted together and applied to the situations described
herein, can best be understood to mean that “when a lawyer, acting on behalf
of a client, deals with an unrepresented person, the burden is on the lawyer
to clear up any misunderstandings about whom the lawyer represents and
where the lawyer’s loyalties lie.”108 The trigger for this clarification is the

100. See infra Part II.B.
101. ROY D. SIMON JR., SIMON’S N.Y. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT ANNOTATED § 1.13:7
(2020).
102. Id.
103. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
104. In House Counsel’s Duty to Give “Miranda” Warnings to Corporate Officers and
Employees, FINDLAW FOR LEGAL PROS. (Mar. 26, 2008), https://corporate.findlaw.com/
litigation-disputes/in-house-counsel-s-duty-to-give-miranda-warnings-to-corporate.html
[https://perma.cc/YW2D-5J4G] [hereinafter In House Counsel’s Duty].
105. See SIMON, supra note 101, § 1.13:8.
106. See id.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.
2000).
108. In House Counsel’s Duty, supra note 104; see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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attorney’s perception that there may be conflicts between the corporation’s
interests and the unrepresented person’s interests.109
These warnings are necessary for the unrepresented constituent because,
“as a general rule,” a corporation’s attorney does not automatically represent
the constituents “by operation of law.”110 The Model Rules do not directly
address how an attorney-client relationship is established;111 rather,
principles of substantive law beyond the scope of the Model Rules determine
the existence of these relationships.112 Such relationships may be determined
on a case-by-case basis and as a factual matter.113 The specific professional
duties attorneys owe in each individual situation, however, may stem from
the creation of such relationships.114 If the attorney fails to clarify the nature
of the duties to the corporate client, the attorney and the constituent can enter
into an inadvertent attorney-client relationship,115 even if the corporate
attorney does not intend to form a relationship with the corporate
constituent.116
Model Rule 4.3 also details that a lawyer should not “give legal advice to
an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person
are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of
the client.”117 An attorney who answers a “fact-specific” legal question can
be “characterized as offering personal legal advice, especially if the lawyer
is responding to a question that can be reasonably understood to refer to the
Posing and answering a
questioner’s individual circumstances.”118
hypothetical question, however, is not considered to be legal advice.119
Similarly, an attorney is not considered to have given legal advice where the
lawyer merely shares legal information with the constituent.120
109. See SIMON, supra note 101, § 1.13:8.
110. Roy Simon, Whom Does a Corporation’s Attorney Represent?, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS
REP.,
http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/whom-does-a-corporations-attorney-represent/
[https://perma.cc/DT4M-X4WM] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
111. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-390 (1995).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See Ingrid A. Minott, Note, The Attorney-Client Relationship: Exploring the
Unintended Consequences of Inadvertent Formation, 86 UNIV. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 269,
288–89 (2009); see also Tate, supra note 5, at 15 (“When an employee is contacted by
corporate counsel, his relationship with her will differ depending on whether she approaches
the employee only as an agent of the entity or offers him personal representation.”).
115. See infra Part II.B.
116. See Tate, supra note 5, at 15.
117. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
118. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 10-457 (2010).
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., TEX. JUD. BRANCH, LEGAL INFORMATION VS. LEGAL ADVICE 5–6 (2015),
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1220087/legalinformationvslegaladviceguidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KNV6-4M8U] (defining: (1) “legal advice” as a written or oral statement
that interprets an aspect of the law, recommends a particular course of action, or applies the
law to a particular factual circumstance; and (2) “legal information” as providing public
information, reciting common legal functioning, referring an individual to resources,
explaining the meanings of terms, or answering questions about deadlines and due dates); see
also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 10-457 (2010) (explaining that when
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Providing information to unrepresented persons—sometimes in the form
of warnings about personal interests or consequences—is not a completely
new idea.121 In criminal cases, for example, conflicts frequently arise where
two or more defendants are represented by the same attorney.122 In such
circumstances, “the trial court has a duty to . . . warn defendants of the
possible risks of such representation.”123 The purpose of such inquiry into a
defendant’s informed decision to retain joint representation is to ensure that
the defendant has not waived the “constitutional right to effective
counsel.”124 In United States v. Gaines,125 for example, the Court noted that
such inquiry—and the process of warning defendants of potential conflicts
of interest—best serves the administration of criminal justice.126
Such clarification also exists in attorneys’ representations of unions.127
For example, when a union is the client, and when the union’s attorney does
not clarify to the union’s employees that the attorney represents the union, a
union employee may inadvertently disclose information under the false
assumption that the attorney will keep the disclosed information
confidential.128 In these situations, the union’s attorney is, therefore,
required to “fully” explain the relationship to the employee at the outset of
any discussions, including the idea that any information the employee
provides to the attorney may be disclosed and shared with the union.129
2. Upjohn and Corporate Warnings
It is especially important for the corporate attorney to clarify the legal
relationship and provide warnings where criminal liability may arise.130
Remedies for such issues exist in corporate investigative contexts,131 where

information is presented on a lawyer’s website, for example, disclaimers can be created to
limit or condition a lawyer’s obligations to potential website readers to avoid any
misunderstandings that: “(1) a client-lawyer relationship has been created; (2) the visitor’s
information will be kept confidential; (3) legal advice has been given; or (4) the lawyer will
be prevented from representing an adverse party”).
121. See generally Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). See also ABA Comm. on
Ethics, Formal Op. 743 (2001).
122. See generally Cuyler, 446 U.S. 335.
123. Id. at 354 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the
trial judge has an obligation to anticipate reasonably foreseeable conflicts). But see Steven J.
Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court’s
Headache, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 337 n.121 (1977) (“The trial court is not required,
however, to warn co-defendants of the disadvantages including possible conflicts of interest
of joint representation.” (quoting Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1076 n.5 (5th Cir.
1975))).
124. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976).
126. See id. at 1044.
127. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Op. 743 (2001).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See generally infra Part I.C.
131. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); In House Counsel’s
Duty, supra note 104.
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Upjohn132 warnings address the issue of privilege.133 These warnings are
provided during investigations to “ensure that the officer or employee is not
unfairly lulled into relying on the corporation’s lawyer for legal advice.”134
When corporate counsel realizes that an individual who is acting on behalf
of the corporation is revealing too much information or information that
reveals a conflict of interest, the corporate attorney has an ethical obligation
to advise the corporate officer of this conflict.135 The attorney must advise
the officer that: (1) corporate counsel is not the officer’s personal counsel
and (2) the corporation’s interests and the officer’s or director’s interests are
opposed.136
Indeed, Upjohn warnings are meant to “set appropriate expectations
between the [c]onstituent and the corporation”137 and might include an
explanation that the officer has a personal interest that conflicts with that of
the corporation.138 Such warnings include a recommendation for the
132. In Upjohn, lawyers for a pharmaceutical company interviewed the corporation’s
managers, officers, and employees about suspicious payments that were made to government
officials abroad. See 449 U.S. at 386–87. Some of these individuals were also asked to
complete questionnaires about the payments as part of an internal investigation. See id. The
Internal Revenue Service also subsequently investigated the matter, requesting that the
company produce the questionnaires, as well as the notes the lawyers took during the
interviews. See id. at 387–88. The pharmaceutical company refused to produce these
documents, claiming that the documents were protected by attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine because they were prepared for litigation. See id. at 388. In its decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the attorney-client privilege exists not only to protect
attorneys’ giving advice to individuals who can actually act on the advice but also individuals’
giving information to an attorney, who can then represent the corporate client better. See id.
at 389–95. The Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit’s judgment that attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine could never
apply to communications with middle- and lower-level employees in such corporate contexts
and, instead, concluded that attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine can
protect certain communications of all constituents acting on behalf of the corporation. See id.
at 386, 391, 397–98, 401–02. The attorney-client privilege is the corporation’s, rather than
the individual’s. See, e.g., id. at 391–93, 395, 397.
133. See generally Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383; see also John K. Villa, When and How to Issue
Corporate Miranda Warnings, 24 ACC DOCKET 76 (2006). These “corporate Miranda
warning[s]” may take a form similar to the following:
As I am sure you know, I and the other members of this
office represent the corporation. We don’t represent you personally. Based on
what you have said, your personal interest may be in conflict with that of
the corporation, and we in the corporate counsel’s office cannot represent you. In
addition, I have an obligation to pass on to the corporation everything you have told
me and will tell me. The corporation may then choose to disclose it or use it adverse
to your interests. I recommend that you seriously consider retaining a lawyer. Only
your own personal lawyer can promise you that your discussions with him or her
will remain strictly confidential. Because of my position as a lawyer for
the corporation, I am not your lawyer and cannot give you that assurance.
Id. (typeface altered).
134. In House Counsel’s Duty, supra note 104.
135. See id.
136. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
137. CROWELL & MORING LLP, UPJOHN WARNINGS: RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES
WHEN CORPORATE COUNSEL INTERACTS WITH CORPORATE EMPLOYEES 10 (2009),
https://www.crowell.com/pdf/abaupjohntaskforcereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6LQ-FJPX].
138. See id.
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constituent to retain a personal attorney not only to ensure that the officer’s
interests are best represented but also to facilitate the communication of legal
advice that is not disclosed to the employer.139 These warnings also protect
the corporation’s interests by ensuring that the attorney does not
inadvertently create an attorney-client relationship that could undermine the
original representation of the corporation.140
Government investigations and the scrutinizing of corporations are
common,141 especially for larger organizations. In 2015, 75 percent of
companies with more than $10 billion in revenue retained counsel to assist
with investigations.142 But while investigations into wrongdoing are
frequent and important, corporations also conduct plenty of other business
that requires a corporate attorney’s perspective on fair dealings and risk.143
Ethical issues for corporate counselors and corporations’ constituents arise
in far more common situations.144
Because the corporate entity is only permitted to act through its
constituents, the question becomes whether corporate attorneys should issue
warnings to these constituents in seemingly banal situations, as well.145 In
routine matters, constituents may not perceive that they have personal
interests or that there are risks associated with their conduct, and they may
assume that they can rely on the advice of corporate counsel.146 Some argue,
therefore, that the general premise and purpose of Upjohn warnings—which
are meant to apply to issues of attorney-client privilege and may arise in
corporate internal investigative contexts—should extend to more routine
interviews or conversations conducted even “in anticipation of litigation.”147
In such communications—about “the good, the bad, and the ugly” of any
particular legal situation—the attorney “should achieve a balance between
informing employees that an attorney-client relationship does not exist
and . . . defend[ing] a [potential] lawsuit properly.”148

139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Effective Corporate Investigations, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/publications/the_brief/20
16_17/winter/effective_corporate_investigations/ [https://perma.cc/C2G8-WHBT] (“In 2014
more than two thirds of companies in the insurance, energy, financial services, and health care
industries reported retaining outside counsel to assist with regulatory and government
investigative activity.”); NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, 2015 LITIGATION TRENDS ANNUAL
SURVEY 61 (2015), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/-/media/files/nrf/nrfweb/imported/
20150514---2015-litigation-trends-survey_v24.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT9X-RXLF]; see also
infra Part I.C.2.
142. See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 141, at 34.
143. See infra Part I.C.2.
144. See Daniel C. Headrick & Ryan L. Harrison, You Have the Right to an Attorney, but
It Might Not Be Me, FOR THE DEFENSE, Apr. 2013 at 39, 39.
145. See id.
146. See generally id.
147. Headrick & Harrison, supra note 144, at 73.
148. Id.
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C. Constituents’ Risks in a Rapidly Changing Corporate Landscape
Corporate attorneys face many ethical and logistical challenges in their
daily work.149 Corporate officers’ and directors’ routine work also raises the
possibility of different kinds of personal liability.150 Commentators and
practitioners increasingly warn that officers can be held personally liable not
only for corporate losses arising from corporate scandals but also for daily
occurrences and failures stemming from ordinary business transactions.151
This is true especially where the constituent—acting on behalf of the
corporation—mistakenly relies on corporate counsel’s advice in a legal gray
area.152
At minimum, a corporate constituent can be terminated for making a
mistake.153 Parties can also bring legal claims against officers or directors
alleging the officers or directors have breached their fiduciary duties.154
Statutory claims can be brought against corporate constituents who have
failed to satisfy the requirements of federal securities laws.155 Most
significantly, if constituents engage in financial crimes, such as bribery or
insider trading, they may face prosecution and imprisonment.156
Fortunately for constituents, most corporate statutes allow corporations’
charters to include provisions that eliminate such liability and indemnify
constituents for monetary damages that may arise from breaches of these
duties.157 These provisions do not, however, allow for waiver of liability for
equitable claims, and they are not applicable to violations of federal law, laws
of foreign countries, or laws of states other than the corporation’s state of
incorporation.158 In certain circumstances, therefore, a constituent’s reliance
on the corporate attorney’s advice—even when given in the corporation’s
best interests—may ultimately cause the individual to be “financially
responsible for malfeasance,”159 or worse.

149. See Janaya Moscony & Julie DiMauro, D&O Liability Insurance: Hazards for the
CCO, FCPA BLOG (July 10, 2019, 12:28 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2019/07/10/do-liabilityinsurance-hazards-for-the-cco/ [https://perma.cc/2L9V-LUYB].
150. See id.
151. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
153. See Richard E. Wood, Hiring, Firing, and Setting the Compensation of Corporate
Officers: Who Has the Authority?, 19 BENEFITS L.J. 77, 81 (2006) (explaining that in
approximately fifteen states, certain officers may remove other officers, whereas in the
remaining states—including Delaware, New York, California, and Pennsylvania—officers do
not have the express authority to remove other officers; rather, these jurisdictions reserve such
authority for the CEO or the board).
154. See Moscony & DiMauro, supra note 149.
155. See Corp. L. Comm., Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 75 BUS. LAW. 2741, 2835
(2020).
156. See Moscony & DiMauro, supra note 149.
157. See Corp. L. Comm., supra note 155, at 2835–36.
158. See id.
159. Josephine Sandler Nelson & Richard O. Parry, Protecting Employee Rights and
Prosecuting Corporate Crime: A Proposal for Criminal Cumis Counsel, 10 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 115, 119 (2013).
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The risks associated with constituents’ reliance on corporate attorneys’
counseling tend to be most pronounced in investigative contexts.160 During
both the waning months of George W. Bush’s administration and the early
years of the Obama administration, the U.S. Department of Justice (“the
Justice Department”) punished few individual executives who had been
“involved in the housing crisis, the financial meltdown and corporate
Historically, corporate entities—rather than individual
scandals.”161
constituents—took the brunt of civil and criminal liability for corporate
malfeasance.162
In 2015, however, the Justice Department issued a new set of guidelines
(“the Yates Memo”) encouraging the prosecution of natural persons and
emphasizing the need for individual accountability with regard to corporate
wrongdoing.163 These new rules encouraged federal prosecutors around the
country to “prioritize the prosecution of individual employees—not just their
companies—and to put pressure on corporations to turn over evidence
against their executives.”164 In issuing the Yates Memo, the Justice
Department recognized that “[c]orporations can only commit crimes through
flesh-and-blood people,”165 and it acknowledged that corporate misconduct
could be most effectively combatted and deterred “by seeking accountability
from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”166 The Yates Memo
sought to erase barriers inhibiting the prosecution and punishment of
corporate constituents engaged in criminal activity.167
The Yates Memo advanced important public policy,168 and since its
issuance, corporate lawyering has shifted in significant ways.169 Indeed, in
seeking accountability from corporate employees, the Yates Memo aimed to
deter future wrongful acts, incentivize corporations to modify and better their
160. See infra Part I.C.2.
161. Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics/
new-justice-dept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html
[https://perma.cc/
4V92-2V69].
162. See id.; see also James K. Robinson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div. of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Address to the Sponsoring Partner Forum Ethics Officer Association (Apr.
6, 2000), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/04-06200-speechjkrobinson.pdf [https://perma.cc/T52P-F7D5] (remarking that corporate crime in
the U.S. health care industry alone results in a loss of $100 billion each year). See generally
Paul Healy & George Serafeim, How to Scandal-Proof Your Company, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July–Aug. 2019, at 42, https://hbr.org/2019/07/white-collar-crime [https://perma.cc/9BFC5YG6] (detailing a study conducted in 2018 suggesting that nearly 50 percent of 7228
organizations surveyed reported economic crime or fraud in the previous year).
163. See Memorandum on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing from Sally
Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/2393039/justice-dept-memo-on-corporate-wrongdoing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UBP2-5RQB] [hereinafter Yates Memo].
164. Apuzzo & Protess, supra note 161.
165. Id.
166. Yates Memo, supra note 163, at 1.
167. See Apuzzo & Protess, supra note 161.
168. See id.
169. See Reed, supra note 19.
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conduct, ensure “proper parties” answer for illegal acts, and maintain public
trust in the justice system.170 Although some say the shifts in policy created
positive change by holding individuals accountable for corporate
misconduct,171 these new guidelines also endangered individual constituents’
rights and broadened the possibilities for personal liabilities.172
In the wake of the “spate” of corporate scandals that inspired the Yates
Memo, “lawyers, directors, and academics have taken an increased interest
in the professional responsibility challenges faced by corporate counsel.”173
In an increasingly litigious environment, therefore, it is important for
corporate management to understand their duties and obligations to the
corporation and its shareholders, “the legal safeguards available to them and,
perhaps more important, the limits of those safeguards.”174
II. THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY’S DILEMMA: STRUCTURING CORPORATE
REPRESENTATIONS
Corporate attorneys wear many different hats when representing
corporations and therefore must interact with a wide variety of individuals.175
Although it is generally assumed that a corporate attorney owes undivided
loyalty to the corporate client176—an entity that is distinct from its
flesh-and-blood constituents and its shareholders177—the corporation’s
routine matters can implicate the personal interests of the individuals in
charge, complicating the attorney’s work.178 The law’s “assumptions” about
corporate attorneys’ loyalties in these situations “seem less than solid.”179
Indeed, where a corporation’s constituents’ interests diverge from those of
the corporation, the corporate attorney is confronted with a challenging
balancing act.180
The Model Rules provide general guidelines that help corporate attorneys
avoid the myriad legal and ethical pitfalls associated with representing
corporations.181 The Model Rules do not, however, recommend the best way
for corporate attorneys to structure their interactions with corporate
constituents, especially in routine contexts.182 The Model Rules also do not
170. Yates Memo, supra note 163, at 1.
171. See supra note 163 and accompanying text; see also Apuzzo & Protess, supra note
161.
172. See Apuzzo & Protess, supra note 161.
173. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 28, at 4.
174. Reed, supra note 19.
175. See supra Part I.A; see also Jonas, supra note 93, at 619 (“The client to which [the
attorney] owes undivided loyalty, fealty, and allegiance cannot speak to him except through
voices that may have interests adverse to his client.”).
176. See infra Part II.B.
177. See Jonas, supra note 93, at 617; see also supra Part I.A.
178. See Jonas, supra note 93, at 619; see also supra Part I.C.
179. Jonas, supra note 93, at 618.
180. See Robert J. Landry, III, Joint Representation of a Corporation and Director/Officer
Defendants in a Stockholder Derivative Suit: Is it Permissible?, 18 J. LEGAL PRO. 365, 366
(1993).
181. See generally supra Part I.A.
182. See generally supra Part I.A.
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adequately define the relationship between the corporate lawyer and
corporate constituents.183 These principles are “incomplete” and fail to
provide clear guidance to attorneys who strive to “conscientiously discharge
their obligations” to the corporate client.184
To avoid immense frustration, attorneys “do not [frequently] concern
themselves with these ethical considerations.”185 The “substance of the
problem” is similarly untouched by the bar and the bench,186 perhaps in an
effort to encourage attorneys to treat corporations as natural persons for
purposes of adhering to ethical standards.187 Corporate attorneys’ duties and
responsibilities when interacting with, providing advice to, and giving
relevant information to corporate constituents thus remain unclear.188 The
existing guidance on the issue is unsettled at best.189
Part II examines how corporate attorneys have typically structured their
routine interactions and communications with corporate constituents. Part
II.A evaluates the widely accepted method of structuring such interactions—
known as the “entity theory”—whereby corporate attorneys represent solely
the corporation and advise constituents about the corporation’s interests only.
Part II.B addresses an alternative method of formulating these
relationships—known as “joint representation”—whereby the corporation’s
attorney represents both the corporation as an entity and its constituents as
individuals.
A. The Entity Theory of Corporate Representation
Corporate attorneys have typically structured communications with
corporate constituents pursuant to the entity theory of corporate lawyering.190
This is the communication structure that has been referenced throughout this
Note.191 Notably, some legal scholars argue that a corporate attorney who
applies this methodology need not “explain the nature of corporate
representation to the communicating executive” in routine legal matters,192
unlike in corporate criminal investigations where attorneys routinely issue
Upjohn warnings.193
183. See generally supra Part I.A.
184. Rutledge, supra note 46, at 357; see also Miriam P. Hechler, The Role of the
Corporate Attorney Within the Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L.
943, 954 (1996) (“The corporate lawyer who resorts to [the Model Rules] for assistance
usually finds nothing more than silence or vague generalities that are of little help in solving
practical, immediate concerns.” (quoting Frederick W. Kanner, Overview of Professional
Responsibility Issues for the Corporate Lawyer, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LEGAL
REPRESENTATION 211, 221 (1988))).
185. Jonas, supra note 93, at 619.
186. Id. at 619–20.
187. See id. at 620.
188. See Rutledge, supra note 46, at 357.
189. See supra Part I.A.1.
190. See generally Cohen v. Acorn Int’l Ltd., 921 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Tricarico
v. Baer, No. 31988-2013, 2015 WL 1641626 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015).
191. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
192. JOHN W. GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 3D § 2:15 (2021).
193. See id.
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The entity theory is a compelling way to structure these relationships for
several reasons.194 First, an attorney can easily identify the client.195 Under
the entity theory of “organizational representation,” an attorney who
represents an organization or a corporation “owes professional duties of
loyalty and competence” solely to the entity.196 The attorney does not owe
duties of care, diligence, or confidentiality to the corporation’s
constituents.197 Second, the entity theory allows an attorney to separate the
interests of the corporation from those of the corporation’s constituents.198
According to the entity theory, corporate lawyers only give officers and
directors advice pertaining to their roles as representatives of the
corporation.199 Third, the entity theory approach makes it easier for
corporate attorneys to protect corporations’ best interests while diminishing
concerns about the creation of inadvertent attorney-client relationships and
the neglect of constituents’ personal interests.200 The entity theory’s
elimination of such concerns serves the corporate client’s best interests
because “the flow of information and decisionmaking is not impaired by
needless warnings to constituents with important responsibilities or
information.”201
Critics have noted the traditional entity theory’s shortcomings.202 Hostile
takeovers, in which corporate attorneys are expected to advise their corporate
clients, are a salient example of the entity theory’s limitations.203 They
involve fights for the control of a corporation and ultimately create conflicts
for the corporation and its officers.204 A corporate attorney, however, is
expected to represent the “entity.”205 The reality of these situations is that
the entity may not exist by the end of the takeover, and the identity of the
client may become unclear.206 The entity theory of representation has,
therefore, been slated as “unrealistic” and “objectionable.”207

194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (AM. L.
INST. 2000).
195. See id.; see also Kim, supra note 43, at 191; Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39, at
18.
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b.
197. See id. (explaining that third-party “non-clients,” such as corporate constituents,
cannot “reasonably conclude . . . that a lawyer for the organization represents officers
individually”).
198. See id.; see also Kim, supra note 43, at 191; Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39, at
18.
199. See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text.
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. f; see also
supra Part II.
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. e.
202. See generally Hechler, supra note 184.
203. See id. at 943–45; see also Scott L. Olson, The Potential Liabilities Faced by In-House
Counsel, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.15 (1998).
204. See Hechler, supra note 184, at 943–45; see also Olson, supra note 203, at 4 n.15.
205. See Hechler, supra note 184, at 943–45; see also Olson, supra note 203, at 4 n.15.
206. See Hechler, supra note 184, at 943–45; see also Olson, supra note 203, at 4 n.15.
207. Hechler, supra note 184, at 944; see also Olson, supra note 203, at 4 n.15.
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The corporate attorney is left with “little or no guidance from the Model
Rules”208 about how to handle corporate constituents’ interests in these
routine matters.209 The Model Rules themselves acknowledge that “[t]he
proposition that the organization is the lawyer’s client does not alone resolve
the issue.”210 Many have similarly criticized the entity theory in additional
contexts, including—but not limited to—situations involving attorneys’
representations of venture capital firms and banking institutions.211
Further, many recognize that corporate constituents are extremely
“vulnerable in a relationship with an attorney who represents [the] corporate
employer,”212 especially where the constituents’ personal interests may be
implicated.213 This vulnerability may arise out of attorney-client privilege
concerns or power dynamics.214 In light of these vulnerabilities, some argue
that there are actions corporate attorneys must pursue when engaging with
nonclients.215 In Reinert v. Indeck,216 for example, the court acknowledged
that a lawyer can owe a limited duty to a nonclient.217 Thus, in the context
of corporate representation, an attorney’s “diligent representation can impose
a duty”218 on the attorney also to “act on behalf of someone other than the
organization.”219 Indeed, corporate attorneys’ duties realistically extend
Some
beyond standard allegiances to legal corporate entities.220
commentators have advised corporate attorneys to take a more proactive
approach when dealing with nonclients; for example, the attorney should at
least advise the constituent to retain independent counsel, if necessary.221
Finally, others have argued that corporate attorneys’ duties must be
entirely reimagined and divested from the traditional entity theory.222 Under
this view, attorneys should not represent abstractions—including

208. Hechler, supra note 184, at 943.
209. See id.; see also George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and Effective
Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 608 (1988)
(noting that the lawyer’s representation of the corporation as an entity presents the lawyer
“with conflicting duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and zeal owed to the various
[constituents] . . . that make up the organizational client”).
210. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (commenting
on issues that arise regarding client identity and client interests in other similar derivative
contexts).
211. See Hechler, supra note 184, at 955 n.66.
212. Tate, supra note 5, at 58.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See James Mulcahy & Douglas Luther, Walking the Line: When Are The Franchisor’s
In-House Counsel’s Communications or Advice to a Franchisee an Ethical Violation?, 37
SPG FRANCHISE L.J. 571, 572 (2018).
216. No. A-4119-16T1, 2018 WL 4262095 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2018).
217. See id. at *6.
218. Rutledge, supra note 46, at 372.
219. Id. See generally Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309
N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
220. See Jonas, supra note 93, at 622.
221. See D. Ryan Nayar, Almost Clients: A Closer Look at Attorney Responsibility in the
Context of Entity Representation, 41 TEX. J. BUS. L. 313, 337 (2006).
222. See Jonas, supra note 93, at 622.
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corporations—at all.223 Rather, corporate attorneys should represent and
owe fiduciary duties to the individual constituents who hire and fire the
lawyers on the corporation’s behalf.224 One commentator has acknowledged
that the board and the management of any corporation inevitably make
decisions that are in the corporation’s best interests.225 If the directors and
officers conduct themselves appropriately, it seems obvious that the
“corporation’s interests when viewed as a separate entity become a non
sequitur.”226 In other words, if the primary concern of corporate law and
corporate representation is to preserve the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, the “professional responsibilities of the corporate attorney”
also must reflect that reality.227
Practitioners have acknowledged that the entity theory mechanism
provides an important frame of reference for corporate attorneys.228
Nonetheless, as evidenced by the many interpretations of the entity theory,
its advantages, and its shortcomings, the entity theory approach neglects to
appropriately consider the complicated relationships between corporate
attorneys, corporations’ interests, and corporate constituents’ risks.229
B. Joint Representation of Corporations and Corporate Constituents
As an alternative to the entity theory, corporate attorneys also structure
communications with constituents to include consideration of the
constituents’ interests and the corporation’s interests.230 These joint
representations are not uncommon231 and may permit a corporate attorney to
advise a constituent about personal risks associated with certain conduct.
The Model Rules do not suggest that there is anything inherently unethical
about joint representation.232 In fact, many corporations permit corporate
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39, at 17.
229. See id. at 30.
230. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
231. See Kathryn M. Fenton & Ryan C. Thomas, “The Rules of Professional Conduct Are
Not Aspirational”: Joint Representation of Corporations and Their Employees, 8 ANTITRUST
SOURCE 1, 2 (2009) (remarking that joint representation as between corporations and their
“owners, executives, or officers” is not uncommon).
232. See SPAHN, supra note 40 (explaining that Model Rule 1.13 acknowledges the
possibilities of joint representation, such that “[a] lawyer representing an organization may
also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7”); see also Nancy J. Moore, Expanding
Duties of Attorneys to “Non-Clients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in
Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 677
(1994) (explaining that the purpose of ethics rules and guidelines about entity representation
“is not to exclude the possibility that the entity lawyer might also represent one or more
individuals, but rather to clarify that a lawyer who represents an entity” does not automatically
then also represent the entity’s constituents (quoting 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.13:102, at 387 (2d ed. 1993))); Landry, supra note 180, at 373.
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counsel to jointly represent the company’s employees, especially in instances
where such constituents face personal liability.233 Model Rule 1.13(d), for
example, permits such representations “[u]nless the lawyer fails to obtain the
clients’ informed consent, or the conflict is so severe that a reasonable lawyer
would not . . . represent the clients in those particular circumstances.”234 Put
differently, to pursue joint representation, the corporate lawyer must obtain
informed consent235 from both the corporate client and the prospective
individual client.236 Informed consent means that both clients fully
understand the related risks and the possible alternatives to joint
representation,237 the extent to which confidential information will be shared
between the parties,238 and the consequences associated with the clients’
potential withdrawal from the joint representation.239
In addition to obtaining consent, attorneys’ representation of constituents
can also sometimes arise inadvertently.240 Model Rule 1.13, for example,
requires attorneys to clarify their roles241 in situations where a constituent
intends to harm the corporate client.242 Attorneys’ duty to clarify the nature
of their obligations is determined by the specific circumstances of each
situation.243 When attorneys explain the nature of representation, they are
required only to “clear up any misunderstandings.”244 When corporate
attorneys fail to do so—or when corporate attorneys inadvertently give

233. See Ethical Problems Complicate Joint Representation of a Company and Its
Supervisors,
FINDLAW
FOR
LEGAL
PROS.
(Mar.
26,
2008),
https://corporate.findlaw.com/human-resources/ethical-problems-complicate-jointrepresentation-of-a-company-and.html [https://perma.cc/RW4B-XGFR].
234. Moore, supra note 232, at 664.
235. See Nineteen Twenty Four, Inc. v. Parachini, No. 653984/2014, 2015 WL 682814,
at *8–9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 2015) (holding that “no proper consent was given” and, thus,
Parachini “met his burden of establishing that continued representation . . . violate[d] 1.13 and
1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct”).
236. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-390 (1995).
237. See Lucian T. Pera, Needed Warnings to Happy Joint Clients, AM. BAR ASS’N.
(Nov.-Dec.
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/publications/
law_practice_magazine/2018/ND2018/ND2018Ethics/
[https://perma.cc/NHC2-ZFLB]
(addressing the reality that all joint representations carry potential for conflicts of interest and
other risks, including the potential for time lost, hefty expenses, and inconvenience).
238. See id. (recognizing that part of the danger of joint representation includes the
obligation of confidentiality to each client, that those obligations may conflict with other
duties owed to each client, and that representing multiple clients in related matters is,
therefore, different than representing multiple clients in unrelated matters).
239. See NYCLA Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 747 (2014).
240. See supra Part I.B.1.
241. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
242. See SIMON, supra note 101, § 1.13:8 (explaining that if the constituent’s interests
merely differ from those of the corporation, rather than being adverse, the lawyer is not
required to provide such warnings).
243. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. e (AM. L.
INST. 2000).
244. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also SIMON, supra note 101, § 1.13:8
(explaining that the lawyer might advise the constituent that a conflict or a potential for a
conflict exists, that the lawyer does not represent the constituent in connection with the matter,
and that the constituent may want to retain independent counsel).
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constituents legal advice or legal opinions245—constituents may assume the
attorneys also represent the constituents’ personal interests.246 If the
assumption is “reasonable,” an attorney-client relationship is inadvertently
created.247 Courts have recognized that lay persons may have mistaken
expectations about attorneys’ roles.248 Regardless of a joint representation’s
formation, therefore, attorneys are responsible for observing and assessing
changes in clients’ circumstances that may compromise the representation—
including waivers, contractual limitations, or the use of shadow counsel.249
There are many reasons why a corporate attorney, a corporation, and its
constituents might prefer joint representation.250 First, joint representation
of two or more parties is permitted and attractive because, depending on the
circumstances, it can be in the clients’ best interests “to risk the inherent
dangers of multiple representation” to achieve cheaper251 and more efficient
counseling.252 One commentator suggests that “a corporation’s attorney may
reasonably aid the corporation’s officers to retain power but only if such aid
is in the corporation’s best interest.”253 Second, joint representation can help
corporations and their constituents form a united front, especially when their
interests are more or less aligned254 and litigation becomes necessary.255 An
attorney who pursues the joint representation of several clients in a related
matter also may receive more revenue for legal services provided to the
clients.256

245. See generally Minott, supra note 114.
246. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
247. Id.
248. See Steines v. Menrisky, 222 F. Supp. 3d 648, 653 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“[T]he pertinent
question is not whether [the officer] subjectively believed that [counsel] represented him
personally, but whether that belief was reasonable.”). See generally Schiffli Embroidery
Workers Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck & Co., Civ. A. No. 91-5433, 1994 WL 62124 (D.N.J.
Feb. 23, 1994) (explaining that the court assessed New Jersey’s modification of Model Rule
1.13(d), so the need to provide warnings arises when the lawyer believes an explanation of
such warnings is necessary).
249. See NYC Bar Comm., Formal Op. 2004-02 (2004); see also Shadow Counsel,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining such standby counsel as “a
court-appointed or privately hired lawyer who is prepared to assume representation of a client
if the client’s primary lawyer withdraws or is fired by the client”).
250. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Three’s a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation,
32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 429 n.182 (2001) (explaining the logical reasons why a corporate
defendant would prefer a lawyer to represent all defendants jointly, including that joint
representation can minimize attorney fees).
251. Moore, supra note 232, at 664.
252. See id.; see also Melody Nashan, OCDC Article: Joint Representation: Analysis
Required,
OFF.
OF
CHIEF
DISCIPLINARY
COUNS.
(July
1,
2015),
https://www.mochiefcounsel.org/newsP.htm?id=38
[https://perma.cc/UKR5-4GTM]
(explaining that “shared counsel” can save parties costs in legal fees and can mitigate the
duplication of lawyers’ efforts in the same matter).
253. Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney’s Duty to the Corporation a
Paradigm for Directors?, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 687 (1988).
254. These interests still may be aligned even if they are “different,” so long as the interests
between the parties are not “adverse.” See infra Part III.B.
255. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
256. See Bassett, supra note 250, at 390.
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Further, some practitioners and courts have supported the joint
representation of corporations and corporations’ constituents in routine
derivative suits, for example.257 In such circumstances, it appears “[a]t first
blush” that the interests of the corporation are adverse to those of its
constituents.258 But, a corporation is unlikely to want to sue its officers or
directors in a derivative action.259 Those who support joint representation
warn against assuming that parties’ interests are so conflicting that separate
counsel is necessary, especially at the outset of such suits.260
There are, however, some “potentially significant detriments for both the
company and the individual” associated with joint representation.261 For
one, representing a corporation’s officers or directors together with the
corporation in the same matter may present conflicts of interest for the
attorney, including attorney-client privilege concerns.262 Generally, such
conflicts must be tested against the criteria of Model Rule 1.7.263 Lawyers
frequently avoid such situations entirely due to these concerns.264
Joint representation also may be problematic when it is likely that neither
the corporation nor the individual constituent fully appreciates the complex
Dual
relationship that arises out of the shared representation.265
representation effectively transforms the lawyer’s duties such that “the
lawyer then owes total loyalty to both the organization and the individual
constituent.”266 One commentator notes that this can lead to further conflicts,
especially where the employer (e.g., the corporation) pays the costs of the
constituent’s legal representation.267
Finally, if the interests of the jointly represented clients become adverse or
conflicting—rather than merely divergent or different—the lawyer is obliged

257. See generally Voss v. Sutardja, No. 14-CV-01581-LHK, 2015 WL 349444 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 26, 2015) (acknowledging the risks associated with a lawyer’s jointly representing a
corporation and its directors but, nonetheless, allowing companies and companies’
constituents to pursue joint representation at certain stages of litigation).
258. New Support for Joint Representation of Company and Directors in Derivative
Litigation, JONES DAY (Feb. 2015), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2015/02/newsupport-for-joint-representation-of-company-and-directors-in-derivative-litigation
[https://perma.cc/PCC7-G72M].
259. See id. (reasoning that the interests of the company and the interests of the individual
director defendants may be aligned at the outset of such an action because both the entity and
the individuals want to defeat the claims against them).
260. See id.
261. Fenton & Thomas, supra note 231, at 1.
262. See generally SPAHN, supra note 40; see also Bassett, supra note 250, at 390
(explaining that joint representation of clients also risks diluting the lawyer’s duty of loyalty
to each client).
263. See SIMON, supra note 101, § 1.13:33 (explaining that Model Rule 1.7 permits
multiple representation unless the lawyer does not believe that the lawyer “will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client”).
264. See SPAHN, supra note 40, at 25.
265. See Fenton & Thomas, supra note 231, at 1.
266. SIMON, supra note 101, § 1.13:10.
267. See Bassett, supra note 250, at 429–31.
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to withdraw from the representation of both clients entirely.268 This, of
course, poses a great risk for both the corporation and any director or officer
of a corporation that requires subsequent legal advice and counseling, and it
also can result in significant inefficiencies, directly contradicting the original
justification of joint representation.269
A recent disciplinary proceeding exemplifies the challenges of joint
representation.270 In 2011, Cynthia Baldwin represented Pennsylvania State
University (“Penn State”) in investigations into Gerald Sandusky’s pattern of
child sexual abuse on the Penn State campus.271 Baldwin also represented
three of Penn State’s administrators during grand jury proceedings,
inadvertently creating attorney-client relationships with each of them.272 In
2017, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel273 charged Baldwin with multiple
counts of professional misconduct274 for failing to correct the officials’
misinterpretations of her representation.275 Then, in July 2020, Baldwin was
formally reprimanded by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania (the “Disciplinary Board”) via a session conducted on
YouTube.276 According to the Disciplinary Board, Baldwin “violated four
provisions of the state ethics code for lawyers” in her representation of Penn
State and its three top administrators.277 The chairperson of the Disciplinary
Board concluded that Baldwin’s missteps in her representation “fatally
undermined the cases against the three administrators,”278 which left the
three administrators—charged with felony perjury, obstruction, and child
268. See SPAHN, supra note 40, at 67 (“[T]he development of any adversity between the
jointly represented clients almost inevitably requires the withdrawal from representation of
both clients.”).
269. See id.
270. See Off. of Disciplinary Couns. v. Baldwin, 225 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. 2020).
271. See id. See generally Commonwealth v. Curley, 131 A.3d 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Spanier,
132 A.3d 481 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
272. See Baldwin, 225 A.3d at 820.
273. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel “investigates and prosecutes attorney
misconduct.” Structure of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE SUP. CT. OF PA., https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/
about/structure [https://perma.cc/BL7W-MLZC] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). The Office of
Disciplinary Counsel functions under the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, and the Chief Disciplinary Counsel is an extension of the Disciplinary Board
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The mission of the Disciplinary Board “is to protect
the public, maintain the integrity of the legal profession, and safeguard the reputation of the
courts.” Our Mission, DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE SUP. CT. OF PA.,
https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/about [https://perma.cc/G2QE-NNZ9] (last visited Aug.
9, 2021).
274. See Baldwin, 225 A.3d at 820.
275. See SPAHN, supra note 40, at 72 (citing Shannon Green, Was Penn State’s GC Counsel
for University Officials?, CORP. COUNS. (Feb 3. 2012), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/almID/1202541166368/ [https://perma.cc/YG5D-EGFD].
276. See Craig R. McCoy, For Errors in Jerry Sandusky Case, Former Penn State Attorney
Gets Scolding From Lawyers’ Board, MORNING CALL (July 22, 2020, 3:45 PM),
https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-pa-penn-state-cynthia-baldwin20200722-n6cwqyufonb77cfrvb53jpteyi-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ95-C2NW].
277. Id.
278. Id.
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endangerment—to each serve less than three months in prison.279 Her failure
to clarify her role also compromised her representation of Penn State.280
Baldwin thus “found herself embroiled in a high-profile question about
whether she had simultaneously represented the [u]niversity” and its
high-level officials.281 Baldwin’s conduct in the Penn State representations
constituted a “‘worst-case scenario’ for ethical miscalculation in”282 the joint
representation context.
Notwithstanding its many virtues, one commentator suggests that joint
representation of entities and their constituents, as evidenced by Baldwin’s
indiscretion, does not adequately solve the problems addressed in this
Note.283 To the contrary, the risks of joint representation—“to the clients, to
the attorney, and to society”—far outweigh its benefits.284
III. REIMAGINING CORPORATE ATTORNEYS’ ETHICAL DUTIES
Both the Model Rules and case law generally support the entity theory over
relationships that extend corporate attorneys’ duties to corporate
constituents.285 Still, “courts are beginning to recognize that in some entity
cases,” the entity’s lawyer may, indeed, owe a duty to the entity’s
constituents.”286 This Part proposes that the ABA—with individual states to
follow—adopt a new Model Rule that requires corporate attorneys to inform
corporations’ constituents of the personal risks and liabilities that may arise
from acts taken on behalf of the corporation. Part III.A addresses why
common corporate attorney-constituent interactions and relationships—
including the entity theory and joint representations—are unsustainable. Part
III.B assesses why a new model rule is necessary to fill in the gaps that still
exist in corporate counseling. Finally, Part III.C proposes the draft language
of this new model rule: Model Rule 1.13(h).
A. The Shortcomings of Corporate Law’s Entity Theory and Joint
Representation
Corporate attorneys have typically structured their interactions with, and
their counseling of, the corporate client in several ways.287 Until now,
determining the scope of attorneys’ duties to nonclients has been
“complicated by competing policy demands,”288 similar to policy

279. See id.
280. See id.
281. SPAHN, supra note 40, at 72.
282. Lance Cole, Multiple Representation Meltdown: “Penn State Three” Case Illustrates
Entity Representation Pitfalls for Both Criminal Defense Counsel and Prosecutors—and the
Need for Systemic State Law Reforms, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 590 (2018).
283. See Bassett, supra note 250, at 458.
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 232, at 673.
286. Id.
287. See supra Part II.
288. Moore, supra note 232, at 660.
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considerations of “accountants, architects, and engineers.”289 Perhaps the
most important public policy concern that an attorney faces in offering advice
to nonclients is the possibility that doing so may diminish the quality of the
lawyer’s representation of the original client.290
There are significant ramifications associated with maintaining the entity
theory approach when counseling corporate clients, especially with respect
to attorneys’ ethical duties and constituents’ interests.291 The entity theory—
whereby the corporate attorney exclusively owes duties to the corporation or
the entity rather than to its constituents—is, admittedly, appealing for its
simplicity.292 It is easier for a corporate attorney to understand the
significance of representing one client and one client only.293 This kind of
representation also contributes to the problem addressed in this Note.
For example, if the corporate attorney only focuses on giving advice
pertinent to the corporation’s interests, the attorney will have failed to
acknowledge the complexities of corporations and will have potentially
harmed the corporation’s constituents’ interests in the process.294 Further,
by only focusing on the corporation’s needs without considering the
individuals that make up the corporation and these individuals’ interests, the
corporate attorney risks misleading these constituents—a fatal ethical
maneuver—such that they are unaware that a distinction even exists between
their interests and the corporation’s interests.295 The lawyer is prohibited
from misrepresenting material matters of the lawyer’s representation when
dealing with the unrepresented constituents.296
Surprisingly, the Model Rules do not require the corporate attorney to
inform unrepresented constituents that they may need independent counsel,
even though a constituent’s personal interests might be so important that they
should retain independent counsel.297 Rather, the Model Rules and ethics
jurisprudence leave this decision up to the particular facts of the situation.298
Regardless, merely advising the corporation’s constituents that they may
require independent counsel is a potentially useless exercise.299 Even if a
lawyer does advise the constituent to retain counsel, without understanding
why the constituent requires representation independent of the corporation,
the constituent may not know exactly whom to contact for help, whom to
hire, or what personal interests are at stake. The attorney’s advice to the
constituent to retain independent counsel without any context or further
289. Id. at 661.
290. See id.
291. See supra Part II.A.
292. See supra Part II.A.
293. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (AM. L.
INST. 2000).
294. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 39, at 30.
295. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. a.
296. See id.
297. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
298. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. e.
299. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. e.
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explanation might even scare the constituent into acting in derogation of the
corporation’s best interests. This conduct could, in turn, make the
constituent’s matters worse. This could cause more negative consequences
than an attorney’s explaining the constituent’s personal interests at stake
from the start.
Further, there are significant limitations that corporate attorneys face when
pursuing joint representation of both the corporation and its constituents.300
Notwithstanding the potential solutions that a corporate attorney’s joint
representation may provide,301 joint representation poses far too many
Such representation might affect the
potential complications.302
corporation’s best interests; after all, the corporation is the original client and
is most likely paying for the representation.303 Moreover, the corporate
attorney faces personal liability, as well as ethical and other disciplinary
proceedings stemming from incorrectly navigating such representations.304
B. Resolving Ethical Ambiguities and Pitfalls
Given the inadequacies and the problems associated with traditional forms
of corporate lawyering, the law should facilitate a new way for corporate
attorneys to structure their interactions with corporations’ constituents. The
Thus, corporate
corporate world is a demanding environment.305
constituents should understand their duties, their rights, and the potential
risks associated with acting—even in routine ways—on behalf of the
corporation.306 Such clarification can mitigate constituents’ personal
liability, help the corporation make informed choices about its affairs through
its personnel, and allow constituents to consider whether they should be
serving in their capacities for the corporation at all.307 Part III.B.1 addresses
the need for a new structure in corporate representation. Part III.B.2 explains
why such a structure is appropriate and permissible within the bounds of the
law.
1. Including Constituents’ Interests in Legal Ethics
In investigative circumstances, the interests of the officers and other
corporate employees can be adverse to those of the corporation.308 In the
wake of the Yates Memo and many notorious corporate scandals,
corporations have been shown to implicate their constituents in wrongdoing
in exchange for governmental cooperation credits.309 Constituents’ interests
and the corporation’s interests in such scenarios are fundamentally in conflict
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
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because corporations cannot go to prison like individuals can.310 Similarly,
corporations are more likely than individuals to have the resources to pay
hefty fines imposed by the government or by other regulatory agencies.311 In
such situations, the law has established Upjohn warnings to protect
constituents.312
But the law has not yet come around to mandating any such warnings in
noninvestigative contexts.313 In daily transactional matters and routine
counseling, the interests are not necessarily conflicting, as they may be in
investigations. To the contrary, corporations are known for taking care of
their employees and their most important officers in “normal”
circumstances.314 Upper-level managers of corporations are frequently
granted noncash benefits and other valuable perks by the corporation,
indicating these individuals’ value and importance to the company’s
operations.315 Thus, the interests of the corporation and its employees are
usually aligned outside of investigative contexts.316 In routine matters where
the corporate attorney merely advises the corporate constituents to act in the
best interests of the corporation, the corporation has no reason to exchange
incriminating information about its officers and directors with enforcement
entities.
In routine circumstances, therefore, the worst case scenario is that
constituents’ interests, as compared to those of the corporation, are merely
different rather than adverse.317 But constituents’ differing interests in
routine contexts are no less important than constituents’ adverse interests in
investigative contexts; they, too, warrant warnings or information.318 Even
in routine matters, such constituents have important personal interests
beyond those of the corporation.319 Yet, the interests of the officers and other
authorized constituents in noninvestigative contexts are frequently excluded
from the professional responsibility canon.320
None of this is to suggest that the attorney should lose sight of the fact that
the corporation is, and should be, the actual client. But the reality of
corporate representation is that while corporate internal investigations are
certainly not unusual, ethical issues for corporate counselors also arise in
The daily legal analyses confronting
more common situations.321
310. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
311. See Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries:
An Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 121, 123 (1996)
(“[E]verything else being equal, injured parties are more likely to blame and sue deep-pocket
targets.”).
312. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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314. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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corporations are typically complex and, without proper information, directors
and officers may be subject to severe penalties that, in some cases, may leave
them bankrupt or worse.322 This Note thus asserts that an attorney advising
a corporate client about future conduct should have legal and ethical
obligations to ensure that the flesh-and-blood individuals who manage a
corporation, in addition to the entity itself, understand the prospects of all
legal liabilities associated with proposed conduct, both of personal and
corporate nature.323
Indeed, the reality of corporate representation that the professional
responsibility canon has failed to address is that corporations, as entities,
cannot understand the consequences of their actions without the help and
voices of their constituents.324 The current Model Rules do not consider the
personal liability of such constituents in conjunction with their
decision-making on behalf of the corporation. When advising the
corporation through its constituents, the corporate attorney should, therefore,
make directors and officers aware that they may be included as defendants in
claims against the corporation and that they might incur personal liability.
2. Informing Corporate Constituents About Personal Risks and Liabilities
The restructuring of the relationship between the corporate attorney and a
corporation’s constituents is appropriate and beneficial. A corporate attorney
can inform corporate constituents of their personal risks without forming an
unwanted attorney-client relationship or compromising the client’s
interests.325 Part of the current problem comes from the interpretation of
Model Rule 4.3, which states, in pertinent part, that an attorney will
“typically” need to explain and identify the nature of the client’s
representation and the client’s interests to avoid any misunderstandings.326
But it is unclear if this language is mandatory or merely advisory.327
Although courts have expanded the duties of attorneys to third-party
nonclients in the past,328 “considerable confusion and disagreement”
concerning the scope of such duties persist.329
First, warning a constituent of personal risks attached to a particular course
of action is very different from advising the constituent about what the lawyer
thinks the constituent should do. Objective legal information is very different
than subjective legal advice.330 For example, explaining to a constituent that
the constituent may need to hire an attorney or warning a constituent that
there may be personal risks associated with signing a securities filing is
notably different than the corporation’s attorney advising the constituent to
322.
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avoid signing the filing for personal reasons. By presenting a realistic
preview of the personal risks associated with certain conduct, the corporate
attorney can provide the constituent and the corporate client with the tools to
make more informed decisions.331 Such information is just that—
information.332
Second, relationships already exist in the law whereby nonclients receive
greater information, as well as warnings, about personal risks.333 For
example, judges are permitted to warn defendants of the risks of pursuing
joint representation.334 And attorneys in union representation contexts are
required to “fully” explain the nature of the representation to union
members.335 Thus, corporate attorneys informing corporations’ duly
authorized constituents of potential personal risks associated with routine
business conduct is not as remarkable as one may think. Aside from joint
representation contexts, the law has thus far typically treated corporate
constituents as third-party nonclients; realistically, a far closer relationship
than that exists between the corporate attorney and the corporate client’s
employees.336
C. A New Model Rule: Model Rule 1.13(h)
The current Model Rules provide helpful guidance to the corporate
attorney in dealing with the general matters of corporate representation.337
The Model Rules, as they currently stand, are a good starting point to assess
the issues addressed herein.338 The relevant Model Rules, however, are
insufficient to ensure: (1) that the corporate attorney provides the corporate
client with competent and complete representation and (2) that the personal
interests of the corporation’s management and leadership are protected.339
The Model Rules should, therefore, strongly encourage, if not require,
corporate attorneys to inform corporate clients’ officers, directors, and other
duly authorized constituents of the personal risks that may arise from
engaging in certain conduct on behalf of the corporation and that the
constituent should retain an independent attorney, if necessary. Thus, a new
Model Rule 1.13(h) should be drafted, as follows:
In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall inform such duly
authorized constituents of all reasonably foreseeable personal risks and
liabilities that may arise from relying on advice given in the best interests
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of the organization. The lawyer shall also advise these constituents of their
need to retain independent counsel where such interests may arise.340

It is possible that such warnings—if given too frequently or in
inappropriate circumstances—may have a chilling effect on the interactions
and conversations corporate attorneys have with corporate officers in routine
counseling.341 But, in an increasingly litigious environment, where officers
and directors can face irreversibly harmful liability for corporate conduct, the
adoption of such a rule will surely guarantee that corporate officers’ interests
are neither confused nor overlooked in daily business affairs.342 Such a rule
can prevent grave personal consequences for constituents by requiring that
attorneys provide proper information.343
CONCLUSION
Corporate constituents need legal advice to effectively carry out their
fiduciary duties and other daily corporate responsibilities.344 These
individuals are frequently the ultimate decision-makers for the
corporation.345 These same individuals often have personal interests that
may differ from the corporation’s interests.346 In such situations, a
constituent may not be able to act in the corporation’s best interests. Without
information about the consequences of their actions, these individuals also
may struggle to protect themselves, especially in a rapidly changing
corporate environment.
Accordingly, corporate law should transition away from the status quo of
corporate attorneys’ communications with corporate constituents.347
Instead, corporate attorneys should give information “within the corporate
structure”348 and “without disruption of the chain of command created by the
corporate entity.”349 The continuity of this corporate chain of command
includes advising corporations’ constituents about their personal interests
and the personal liabilities associated with relying on corporate counsel’s
advice. A new rule—Model Rule 1.13(h)—should be created and
subsequently adopted by state codes so that corporate attorneys can inform
corporations’ officers, directors, and other duly authorized constituents of
their personal liabilities before it is too late.
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